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One of the persistent issues that confronts participants in the international
legal order is that of changing the rules of international law through pro-
cedures that are both efficient and timely as well as acceptable to members of
the international community. Changes in international legal rules may be im-
perative because of changing community values (e.g., the international protec-
tion of human rights), the requirements of technological progress (e.g., the
treaties relating to outer space or the continental shelf), or because of obvious
lacunae in otherwise satisfactory and acceptable existing rules (e.g., Interna-
tional Law Commission codification efforts such as the conventions on
treaties and diplomatic privileges and immunities).
In this regard the international legal order is not different from the domestic
legal order in responding to demands for changes in the content of the law.
The uniqueness of the international legal order is apparent, however, when
one understands that the member states of the international community have
not established a systematic and regularized procedure for changing the ex-
isting international legal order. As a consequence the law-changing process is
generally an ad hoc process and may on occasion appear to be a disorderly and
even dysfunctional process.
There are numerous examples wherein the law-changing or law-making pro-
cess (albeit an ad hoc process) is deliberative and systematic. One can mention
as examples the Vienna Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities
and the Geneva Conferences on the Law of the Sea in 1958 and 1960 as well as
the various sessions of the Third Law of the Sea Conference. In these cases the
consequence of the law-making activity (and the expectation of the current
discussions on the law of the sea) was the adoption of conventions which set
forth new rules of international law or which codify and clarify the existing
rules.
It is recognized in the international legal order that change in the content of
the law may also result from the formulation of new customary rules of inter-
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national law by the process of unilateral assertion of legal rights by one state
against other states (e.g., the Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention
Act wherein the Canadian government asserts its legal right to regulate inter-
national navigation through the Northwest Passage in order to protect the
ecology of the Canadian Arctic).' Unilateral law-making may have utility in in-
troducing new concepts and approaches into the legal order in response to
emerging issues and thereby provide flexibility to the legal order. However, the
international legal quality of unilateral actions is uncertain until the actions are
affirmed by other members of the international community as either
customary or treaty rules of law. Moreover the unilateral process is subject to
deliberate or inadvertant abuse by states which may assert particular rules in
order to protect or promote immediate interests rather than seek accommoda-
tion with other states in conformity with widely accepted community values.
Consequently, the unilateral law-changing process is not regularized and
systematic and may be dysfunctional to the international legal order if the
unilaterally asserted legal rules are perceived by other national decision-
makers as destructive of well-established legal rights, or unwarranted and un-
necessary in the light of the relevant situation.2
The United Nations General Assembly also plays a potentially important
role in the law-changing and law-making process. Under Article 13 of the
Charter, the General Assembly has responsibility for facilitating the codifica-
tion and progressive development of international law. The particular organ
charged with this task is, of course, the International Law Commission which
has enjoyed some success in its activities especially in the traditional or
classical areas of the law (e.g., law of the seas, treaties, diplomatic privileges
and immunities). 3 Its success is to a considerable extent a function of the will-
ingness of the Assembly and the member states to follow through with the
Commission's proposals. Notwithstanding that the Commission is a continu-
ing organization of importance to the Assembly, its activities and the powers
granted to the Assembly by the Charter are not such that one can characterize
the Assembly as a legislative body capable of regularly and systematically deal-
ing with a variety of law-making activities.
It is a mistake, however, to conclude that the Assembly's law-making ac-
tivities are limited to responding to the efforts of the International Law Com-
mission. In adopting its resolutions, the Assembly is able to influence the con-
tent of the existing rules of international law and the formulation of new rules
'Canada. 1970. Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. Canada, R.S.C. 1 Supp., c. 2.
2 For a discussion of unilaterial law-making activities, see Don C. Piper, Foreign Policy Outputs
and International Law, in Richard L. Merritt (ed.), FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS (1975), pp. 21-27.3See U.N., THE WORK OF THE INT'L. L. COMM. (1967), and the annual issues of the YEARBOOK OF
THE INT'L. L. COMM.
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of law.4 Moreover, some contemporary scholarship appears to support the
view that certain General Assembly resolutions are legally binding on all
members of the United Nations and, consequently, set forth or affirm the con-
tent of the rules of international law. Those who assert such a position do not
suggest that all Assembly resolutions are legally binding. Rather they identify
particular resolutions which they believe fulfill the elements of intent,
unanimity of support, and opiniojuris and accordingly enjoy a legal character
not generally associated with a "recommendation." 5
It must also be recognized that some Assembly resolutions, although they
may not be legally binding on all member states, may nevertheless have legal
consequences because they may be employed by states to set forth the content
of legal relations with other states. If this is the case, the effect of the resolu-
tions is to change the content of or create new rules of international law, if not
for all states at least for some states.
If one seeks to understand the role of the General Assembly in changing the
content of the existing rules of international law, one must examine both the
process and the consequence of law-changing activities. With regard to conse-
quence, resolutions adopted by the Assembly may change the content of the
international legal rules yet keep the new rules within the general international
legal order. That is, the resolutions may serve to change a specific rule or set
forth a new rule, but the matter under consideration remains a part of the in-
ternational legal order and disputes over related state behavior may be submit-
ted to international judicial machinery. In contrast, Assembly resolutions may
on occasion declare that the rules of international law are not applicable and
that the matter under consideration is outside of the scope of the international
legal order, and is, consequently, regulated solely by national law and policy.
In this event, the law has not been changed; rather the international legal order
4The present writer recognizes that General Assembly resolutions relative to the internal opera-
tion of the organization, such as the adoption of the budget or the admission or expulsion of a
member state, are legally binding on all member states. It will be apparent that our concern is with
Assembly resolutions that address the behavior of states outside of the organization.
5The literature on the legal status of General Assembly resolutions is extensive; see in particular:
0. ASAMOAH, THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECLARATIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE
UNITED NATIONS (1966): J. CASTAr9EDA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS (1969);
R. Falk, On the Quasi-legislative Competence of the General Assembly, 60 A.J.1.L. 782 (1966); S.
Bleicher, The Legal Significance of Re-citation of General Assembly Resolutions, 63 A.J.I.L. 444
(1969); S. Schwebel, LawMaking in the United Nations, 4 Red. L.R. 115 (1970); A. Castles, Legal
Status of U.N. Resolutions, 3 Adelaide L.R. 69 (1967). F. Sloan, The Binding Force of a "Recom-
mendation" of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 25 B.Y.I.L. 1 (1948); L. Sohn, The
Development of the Charter of the United Nations: the Present State, in M. Bos, THE PRESENT
STATE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OTHER ESSAYS 39 (1973); R. Higgins, The United Nations and
Lawmaking: The Political Organs, A.S.I.L. PROCEEDINGS 37 (1970); R. Higgins, The Develop-
ment of International Law by the Political Organs of the United Nations, A.S.I.L. PROCEEDINGS
116 (1965); G. R. Lande, The Changing Effectiveness of GeneralAssembly Resolutions, A.S.I.L.
PROCEEDINGS 162 (1964).
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including the possible use of international tribunals for dispute settlement has
been rejected for the matter at issue. Action by the General Assembly to reject
the international legal order, rather than change the existing legal rules, is a
substantial step and one which if repeated with any frequency would bring
chaos to the international legal order.
With regard to the process of changing the content of the rules of interna-
tional law, Assembly resolutions may originate with legal experts and commit-
tees specifically concerned with the existing body of international law and the
law-making process. This would include resolutions submitted to the
Assembly by the International Law Commission or drawn up by the Sixth
(Legal) Committee. In this situation one would expect that the resolutions
reflect careful legal analysis, and an awareness of the complexities of the ex-
isting rules of international law, and that they would maintain the applicability
of the international legal order.
It is also the case that resolutions having obvious legal consequences come to
the Assembly for adoption from non-legally-oriented bodies such as ad hoc
committees or the Second (Economic and Finance) Committee. In this in-
stance one might anticipate that the committees, in formulating the resolu-
tions, would seek to assert a political or economic policy or direction and that
articulation of the policy was the primary concern, rather than a careful
analysis of legal alternatives. If this is the case, such resolutions may be incom-
patible with existing rules of international legal norms or require subsequent
changes in the existing laws. There is, in fact, evidence suggesting that some
delegates consider that a careful analysis of Assembly resolutions to determine
their compatibility with existing rules of international law is an impediment to
the Assembly's adoption of desired policy statements. 6
The consequences and process of law-changing activity may be seen on the
following page.
The work of the International Law Commission and the conferences to
which it may lead, such as the law of the sea conferences, or the conference on
treaties, are examples of the law-changing process undertaken by legal experts
which serve to maintain the international legal order. Both the Declaration and
the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
prepared by the Legal Sub-committee of the General Assembly Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space are also relevant examples.
The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations, 2625 (XXV), is an example of a resolution affirming legal
6See statements made at the U.N. GAOR 28th Sess., 2d Comm., 1576 and 1577 meetings (1973).
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principles that was prepared by a special committee rather than by an existing
legal committee.
General Assembly resolutions 3171 (XXVIII), 3201 (S-VI), and 3281
(XXIX), which are discussed below, are examples of resolutions which reject
the international legal order and which were referred to the Assembly by
special committees.
Before considering in detail the Assembly resolutions which can be
characterized as attempts to reject the international legal order on specific
issues, it is useful to identify possible reasons why states would adopt
Assembly resolutions which reject part of the legal order. Perhaps the most
persuasive reason to reject the international legal order is the desire of national
decision makers to be able to act unilaterally and exclusively on the basis of
national law and policy. If the international legal order is rejected, national
decision makers then have a free hand in undertaking a proposed action. This
free hand to pursue national policy is reinforced since the rejection of the
international legal order is likely to be accompanied by an assertion that the
acting state will not use international legal machinery in the event of disputes
over the issue. Consequently, the national decision maker eliminates the risk
that international tribunals will set forth controlling legal principles that are
considered by the decision maker to be unwelcome and detrimental to national
action.
States may also seek to reject the international legal order if they believe that
order serves the particular interests of a minority of states and that it is not
responsive to the new values and new directions which the majority articulates.
This argument suggests, at least for the subject matter at issue, that modifica-
tions in the legal order are considered to be inadequate or unacceptable
because the new values and directions proposed by the majority may be incom-
patible with the established values of the existing legal order. Without a change
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in basic values any change in a specific rule will always be subject to challenge.
So long as there are applicable international legal rules that can be invoked by
other states, decision makers are unable to act with confidence that their ac-
tivities will not be subject to legal challenge in substantial international degree.
Consequently, the most efficient response for the majority in this situation is
to reject the legal order itself.
The international legal order may be rejected when the states which wish to
reject the order in a specific issue control the appropriate international agency
(e.g., the United Nations General Assembly), which can declare in a manner
which appears to be authoritative that the international legal order either is no
longer applicable, or never was. Unilateral rejection of a part of the interna-
tional legal order is not likely to be persuasive upon other states; but concerted
action by a substantial majority in the General Assembly to reject the interna-
tional legal order is likely to be more persuasive and more difficult for dis-
senting states to overcome.
It will be helpful, in pursuing this line of inquiry, to examine three General
Assembly resolutions-that on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources
3171 (XXVIII); the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International
Economic Order 3201 (S-VI); and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States 3281 (XXIX) - which I believe reject the international legal order in
the matter of nationalization of alien-owned property and seek to establish the
matter of nationalization as solely dependent upon national law and policy.
In order to understand this writer's contention that the resolutions represent
a rejection of the international legal order and not just a change in the content
of the international legal rules regarding nationalization of alien-owned prop-
erty, it is useful to comment briefly on the status of existing international law
rules regarding nationalization of alien-owned property. 7 In doing so it should
be recognized that some scholars or statesmen may assert that there are no ex-
isting rules of international law regarding the nationalization of alien-owned
property and that the matter is now and always has been solely one of national
law and policy. I find this argument not to be persuasive. Powerful evidence
against the argument is found in the earlier Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII)
on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. That resolution clearly sets
forth that there are relevant rules of international law regarding nationaliza-
tion of alien-owned property which must be taken into account by an acting
state. The resolution provides:
7There are, of course, specific treaties, such as the bilateral commercial treaties which the
United States has concluded with a number of states that contain provisions regarding nationaliza-
tion by one state of property belonging to the nationals of the other state. As treaty rules these pro-
visions are binding only on the signatory parties. My concern here is in articulating the rules of
customary international law which are applicable to all states.
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Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or
reasons of public utility, security or the national interest which are recognized as
overriding purely individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign. In such
cases the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation in accordance with the rules
in force in the State taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in ac-
cordance with international law. In any case Where the question of compensation
gives rise to a controversy, the national jurisdiction of the State taking such measures
shall be exhausted. However, upon agreement by sovereign States and other parties
concerned, settlement of the dispute shall be made through arbitration or interna-
tional adjudication.8
It is apparent that this resolution does not set forth the content of the inter-
national legal rules regarding nationalization of alien-owned property and the
payment of compensation, but it does assert unequivocally that states which
nationalize alien-owned property must take into account the rules of interna-
tional law and that they are not free to assert the exclusive applicability of na-
tional law and policy.
Those familiar with the problem of nationalization of alien-owned property
as an international legal issue are aware that the content of the rules has been
in dispute. 9 It is possible, however, to assert with confidence that there appears
to be a consensus that the discriminatory taking of alien-owned property
without the payment of compensation represents a violation of customary
rules of internlational law and may be the basis of an international legal
claim.' 0 This modest rule is significant because it prohibits a taking of property
which imposes a greater burden on alien owners than upon local nationals in
similar situations.
When we consider the international legal rules regarding the non-
discriminatory taking of alien-owned property, we find substantial disagree-
ment among scholars and government officials. In general terms two distinct
arguments are encountered which reflect different doctrinal perspectives on
the general treatment of aliens with regard to the protection of life and proper-
ty. One argument - national treatment or equality of treatment - holds that
so long as aliens receive the same treatment as a national with regard to the
protection of life and property the international legal requirements are ful-
filled. Consequently, according to this argument, if a state nationalizes prop-
erty of a certain type without distinction as to the nationality of the owners of
8 Italics supplied. In the Assembly debates, delegates differed over the content of international
law rules requiring compensation. This language was considered to represent a compromise be-
tween the different views. See U.N. GAOR 17th Sess., 2d Comm. 834 mtg. (1962). See also S.
Schwebel, The Story of the U.N. 's Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural
Resources, 49 A.B.A.J. 463 (1963).
9 For a useful summary of the differing views, see W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 863ff (3d ed., n.d.)
'
0 This view is reflected in the Court of Appeal's decision in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sab-
batino, 307 F.2d 845 (1962).
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the property, and offers the same compensation arrangement to aliens as it of-
fers to nationals, the requirements of the law have been met. It is clear that this
argument does not guarantee the payment of compensation to aliens for the
taking of their property. It merely guarantees that if nationals receive a com-
pensation arrangement for their property aliens will receive the same compen-
sation arrangement. Traditionally this argument has been articulated by
developing and capital-importing states.
The other argument - based upon the conception that there is a minimum
standard of international justice - asserts that national treatment or equality
of treatment by itself may not be sufficient to meet the international legal re-
quirements. Treatment of aliens must be in accordance with a minimum stan-
dard. If a state's treatment of its nationals is below that minimum standard it
may not extend that level of treatment to resident aliens. Here, then, aliens
must receive preferential treatment in order to reach the level of the minimum
standard. And, with respect to the taking of property, it is generally asserted
by capital-exporting states that this minimum standard requires the payment
of compensation to aliens for the nationalization of acquired property. Conse-
quently, aliens are entitled to compensation for the nationalization of their
property under the requirement of international law although national law and
policy may prohibit payment of compensation to local nationals. Thus, the
failure to pay compensation to aliens for their property creates the basis for an
international claim.
With this background it is now appropriate to consider each of the three
resolutions mentioned above. Resolution 3171 (XXVIII) provides in Article 3
that the General Assembly:
Affirms that the application of nationalization carried out by states, as an expres-
sion of their sovereignty in order to safeguard their natural resources, implies that
each State is entitled to determine the amount of possible compensation and the mode
of payment, and that any dispute which might arise should be settled in accordance
with the national legislation of each State carrying out such measures.
This resolution was brought to the plenary Assembly meeting by its Second
Committee. The language of Article 3 is identical to that included in the
Economic Declaration of the Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Govern-
ment of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Algiers, 5-9 September 1973."1 The
resolution clearly sets forth that the nationalization of alien-owned property is
exclusively a matter of national law and policy. Each state is free to determine
the amount and mode of compensation. There is no reference to international
legal standards as relevant or applicable to the nationalization process.
Moreover the article rejects the use of international legal machinery for
dispute settlement by asserting a Calvo doctrine position that disputes should
"U.N. GAOR 28th Sess. (A9330) (1973).
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be settled in accordance with "national legislation." The obvious consequence
of the resolution is not to change the law or to formulate new international
legal rules regarding the form or amount of compensation but to declare that
the international legal rules regarding both discriminatory and non-discrim-
inatory nationalization activities are not applicable.
This article was adopted by a vote of 86 to 11 with 28 abstentions. The com-
plete resolution was then adopted in the Assembly as a whole by a vote of 108
to 1 with 16 abstentions.
Resolution 3201 (S-VI) the Declaration on the Establishment of a New Inter-
national Economic Order, was adopted by the General Assembly during its
Sixth Special Session in May, 1974. The resolution emphasizes that na-
tionalization of foreign-owned property is an expression of sovereignty that is
not regulated by international legal standards. This article affirms the full per-
manent sovereignty of every State over its natural resources and all economic
activities, and provides:
In order to safeguard these resources, each State is entitled to exercise effective
control over them and their exploitation with means suitable to its own situation, in-
cluding the right to nationalize or transfer of ownership to its nationals, this right be-
ing an expression of the full permanent sovereignty of the State. No State may be sub-
jected to economic, political or any other type of coercion to prevent the free and full
exercise of this inalienable right.
The article was prepared by an ad hoc committee of the Session and subse-
quently adopted in the Assembly without a vote.I3 Although the resolution was
accepted by the consensus process, it is obvious from the comments of several
delegates that they did not concur with the article and its rejection of the inter-
national legal rules on the matter of nationalization.14
In this article the unrestrained right of nationalization is characterized as an
"inalienable right" with which other states must not interfere. Moreover the
article authorizes the acting state to "nationalize or transfer of ownership to
its nationals" which would appear to permit transfer of ownership to private
persons. Such action would appear to be a dramatic departure from the usual
assertion that nationalization of alien-owned property must be undertaken for
public purposes.
Resolution 3281 (XXIX), the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States, in a comprehensive statement of the new international economic order
postulates the right to nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of
foreign property:
2U.N. GAOR 10th Sess., Plenary 220S (1973).
3 U.N. GAOR 6th Special Sess. REPORT OF THE AD Hoc COMMITrEE OF THE SIXTH SPECIAL SES-
SION (A/9556/Part II) (1974). The original proposal is found in Doe. A/AC.166/L 47.
14See the comments of Ambassador John Scali. U.N. GAOR 6th Special Sess., Plenary 2229
(1974). See also the comments of the delegates of West Germany, Canada, Belgium, France,
Spain, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Austria, Australia, Greece and Denmark.
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in which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting such
measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances
that the State considers pertinent. In any case where the question of compensation
gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of the nationaliz-
ing State and by its tribunals, unless it is freely and mutually agreed by all States con-
cerned that other peaceful means be sought on the basis of the sovereign equality of
States and in accordance with the principle of free choice of means. 5
It is obvious here that once again international law is considered to be irrele-
vant to nationalization, which is to be accomplished according to national laws
and "all circumstances" that the state considers pertinent. The reference to
''circumstances" and not "laws" clearly indicates that international legal rules
are considered to be inapplicable. If compensation is to be paid, it will be in ac-
cordance with national, not international, legal rules. Disputes will be settled
in accordance with domestic law and in domestic tribunals.
The article was adopted in Committee by a vote of 104 to 16 with 6 absten-
tions. In plenary, the Charter was adopted by a vote of 120 to 6 with 10 absten-
tions.'6
As has been indicated, this consistent and determined rejection of the inter-
national legal order was accomplished by large majorities in both the commit-
tees and in the Assembly itself. Votes of the western delegates and their com-
ments indicate precisely their disagreement with the action of the majority.
They insisted that the resolutions were contrary to Resolution 1803 (XVII)
which had been adopted in 1962 and that nationalization activities could only
be undertaken by states in accordance with the rules of international law. They
were also critical of the use of the Calvo doctrine to preclude recourse to inter-
national legal machinery to resolve disputes regarding nationalization. 7
It is clear from the committee and Assembly debates that the majority of
states were determined and united in their rejection of the international legal
order. They rejected a compromise statement on payment of compensation of-
fered by the Western states, which called for the payment of "just compensa-
tion in the light of all relevant circumstances."' 8 Although this proposed
amendment retained a reference to compensation for the taking of alien-
owned property, it represented a substantial departure from the traditional
Western view that payment of compensation should be "prompt, adequate,
and effective." Notwithstanding its compromise quality this proposed amend-
ment to the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States was rejected by a
substantial vote.
15Ch. 11, art. 2, 2(c).
16For the general discussion and vote, see U.N. GAOR 29th Sess., 2d Comm., 1649th mtg.
(1974), and U.N. GAOR 29th Sess., Plenary 2315 (1974).17In the documents cited supra note 16, see the comments of the delegates of Finland, Norway,
Australia, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Japan, Austria, and Turkey.
"sUN Doc. A/C.2/L 1404.
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The evident distress of the Western states with the action of the majority was
succinctly stated by the Canadian delegate:
Even among states which like Canada, hold the view that there are principles of
customary international law which are relevant to the treatment of foreign invest-
ment, there is disagreement about the precise content of these principles. Where the
old law is unjust or ineffective, it must be changed to reflect the present economic in-
terdependence of States and the need for development of the developing countries
which are the two most important facts of economic life in our generation. It had
been the hope of my delegation that this Charter could command the consensus
necessary to enable it to contribute to the codification and progressive development
of law in this area; unhappily, this is not the case.'
9
Although the debates on the resolution do not reveal any extended or
systematic discussion of legal intent, there is sufficent evidence to indicate that
the rejection by the majority of the international legal order was deliberate and
not an unintended consequence of participation by delegates unfamiliar with
the corpus of international law or the alternatives available in the law.
From the debates in the General Assembly, several reasons appear to have
motivated the developing states in seeking to make "deep changes of the so far
existing rules of the game. .." regarding nationalization of alien-owned prop-
erty." Many of the delegates shared the view of the Algerian delegate that the
rules of international law were European international law which had been im-
posed upon the former colonies. In the place of such European law, the new
resolutions represented "progressive international law... which particularly
represents the interests of the developing countries."'" In addition to the belief
that the rules of international law were not responsive to developing-state in-
terests, it was also asserted that the existing rules were difficult to interpret and
consequently might be invoked unjustly.
In arguing for the adoption of the resolutions, the developing states gave
substantial emphasis to the importance of national sovereignty. In their view,
activities relating to natural resources and economic activities were expressions
of national sovereignty and as such could not be subject to international legal
rules or international judicial settlement. Invocation of the applicability of in-
ternational legal rules in such matters by the Western states was seen as an at-
tempt to interfere in the internal affairs of the developing states and to con-
tinue imperialist exploitation. Delegates of developing states also asserted that
international law was frequently invoked by the developed states to confuse an
issue and to detract from the rights of developing states.22
If one accepts the arguments of the developing states concerning the necess-
9See U.N. GAOR 29th Sess., Plenary 2315 for comments of the Canadian delegate.
2
°See the comments of the Argentinean delegate, U.N. GAOR 6th Special Sess., Plenary 2229
(1974).21U.N. GAOR 28th Sess., Plenary 2203 (1973).22U.N. GAOR 29th Sess., Plenary 2315 (1974).
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ity of changing the existing rules of international law and establishing a new in-
ternational economic order, it is understandable that the developing states
sought to articulate a positive nationalization program. To the extent that
foreign ownership of natural resources and participation in economic activities
is perceived to represent Western economic exploitation and domination, the
continuation of such participation is seen as wholly incompatible with the new
international economic order. Nationalization is an effective and prompt
technique to end objectionable foreign participation.
Nevertheless one must still ask why these states elected to reject the interna-
tional legal order when an obvious change in the existing rules would appear to
bring the same policy consequence. For example, it may be argued that the
assertion by the General Assembly, on the initiative of the developing states,
that national treatment is the applicable international law standard regarding
the nationalization of alien-owned property, would represent a change in the
law away from the minimum standard of justice which is supported by the
developed states, and would appear to have the same practical consequence for
the developing states. They would be free to nationalize alien-owned property
and to offer compensation in accordance with national law, which is essential-
ly the standard set forth in the articles that we have discussed. If such an op-
tion is available why did the majority reject it and the legal order? Although
the debates do not offer any persuasive answer to this query, two possible ex-
planations for rejecting the international legal order come to mind. The first is
that employment of the national treatment standard would not, and should
not, preclude use of international judicial machinery to resolve disputes over
nationalization activitities. If developing states seek as a matter of principle to
avoid the use of international judicial machinery in nationalization activities,
rejection of the legal order would appear to be the appropriate strategy.2 3 It is
certainly standard practice for states to seek to avoid the use of international
judicial machinery when they perceive that the court may invoke law that they
consider to be inimical to their immediate interests.
Another explanation focuses on the establishment of the new international
economic order and an appraisal of that order in political and psychological
terms.2 4 Nationalization of alien-owned property and the consequent national
23Developing states might wish to avoid international judicial machinery because of an uncer-
tainty that the International Court of Justice or any ad hoc international judicial body would ac-
cept the legal character of General Assembly resolutions asserting national treatment as the ap-
plicable international law standard. If decision-makers perceive that there is some chance that the
court or a mixed claims tribunal might invoke the minimum standard as the applicable interna-
tional law standard, notwithstanding any General Asssembly resolutions to the contrary, they
would not likely agree to the use of international legal machinery.
24For the scope of the new international economic order, see the three resolutions cited above
p. 8. See also the General Assembly resolution 3362 (S-VIII), Development and International
Economic Cooperation, and the Manila Declaration and Program of Action, Feb. 12, 1976, in XV
INT'L. LEGAL MATERIALS (1976), 414-468.
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ownership of local economic activities is one element in the new international
economic order that the developing states can accomplish without awaiting the
cooperation of the Western states. But any action in this regard is subject to
challenge and debate so long as the international legal order is relevant and ap-
plicable. Simultaneous rejection of the international legal order and the adop-
tion of unilateral action might give the developing countries a political and
psychological sense of accomplishment and the new international economic
order an appearance of positive momentum and success.
It may be tempting, upon initial analysis, to dismiss these resolutions and
their possible legal consequences by asserting that General Assembly resolu-
tions are only recommendations and that the resolutions therefore have no
capacity to change or reject the international legal order. Such a response
would be short-sighted. Although the legal character of General Assembly
resolutions is a matter of difference of opinion, it is nevertheless clear that the
Assembly's resolutions may in certain situations have legal consequences for
member states. The view of Judge Lauterpacht in this regard is especially
noteworthy:
.... after full allowance has been made for the necessity of stating what is the inex-
orable legal position resulting from the very nature of 'recommendations', it is not
admissible to give currency to an interpretation, without qualifying it in all requisite
detail, which gratuitously weakens the effectiveness of the Charter. It would be whol-
ly inconsistent with sound principles of interpretation as well as with highest interna-
tional interests, which can never be legally irrelevant to reduce the value of the
Resolutions of the General Assembly - one of the principal instrumentalities of the
formation of the collective will and judgment of the community of nations
represented by the United Nations - and to treat them, for the purpose of this
opinion and otherwise, as nominal, insignificant and having no claim to influence the
conduct of the members. International interest demands that no judicial support,
however indirect, be given to any such conception of the Resolutions of the General
Assembly as being of no consequence.25
On the other hand, it would be dangerous to assume that any resolution
which defies the legal position of a substantial number of the most important
and influential members of the United Nations, can hardly nullify their rights
under general international law, merely because of the numerical quantity of
its supporters. In the instant situation the resolutions may precipitate substan-
tial legal consequences in the sense that some states may conduct nationaliza-
tion activities in accordance with the standards of the resolutions (i.e., without
reference to any requirements of the international legal order). If this is the
case and if these states, in accordance with the resolutions, also utilize their
Calvo doctrine approach and reject international legal machinery, it will be
more difficult, as a practical matter, for any state acting on behalf of its na-
25 Voting Procedure on Questions Relating to Reports and Petitions Concerning the Territory of
South-West Africa. Advisory Opinion of June 7, 1955. I.C.J. REP. 90, 122 (1955).
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tionals to challenge the legality of the action in any international judicial body
or to set forth any international law standard. Consequently nationalization
activity could occur completely outside of the scope and review of the interna-
tional legal order.
Another argument may be advanced to the effect that the articles we have
considered are insignificant and may be ignored because they will have little
consequence on the behavior of states with respect to the nationalization of
alien-owned property. This argument first points-to the permissive rather than
mandatory terms of the articles. In nationalizing alien-owned property, states
may act solely in accordance with national law, but they are not prohibited
from applying the existing rules of international law and providing some form
of compensation.
Since this is the case, it is not unreasonable to argue that some states may
calculate that the potential political and economic costs which might accom-
pany nationalization activities not in accordance with the existing rules of in-
ternational law would be too high for the anticipated benefits. Consequently,
they may elect to offer some form of compensation to the alien owners.
This disposition to ignore the articles and follow existing principles of inter-
national law may also be strengthened for developing states when they con-
sider other goals of the new international economic order such as access to
private capital markets, improved terms of trade, reduction of non-tariff trade
barriers, and transfer of technology. Achievement of these goals, which re-
quires developed state cooperation, would likely be impaired if there was an
extensive nationalization program without any compensation to the alien-
owners. For this reason, one may conclude that the articles could have but a
limited impact on state behavior.
It might also be argued that rejection of the international legal order by the
developing states is not to be considered a significant act but is to be seen as a
temporary act in the nature of a bargaining "chip" in the negotiations with the
Western states for other more important aspects of the new international
economic order. A slightly modified form of this argument suggests that the
nationalization articles were not intended to have any legal consequence but
were intended to serve as a red flag to gain the attention and response of the
Western developed states for other more important economic demands.
This argument has some merit in view of subsequent action by the General
Assembly. At the Seventh Special Session, the Assembly adopted a com-
prehensive resolution on "Development and International Economic
Cooperation," which did not contain any provision regarding nationalization
of alien-owned property. A comparison of the resolution with the proposals
submitted by the Group of 77 indicates the compromise quality of the resolu-
tion and the importance of development goals more sophisticated and signifi-
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cant than could be accomplished by the take-over without compensation of
alien-owned property. The argument is further reinforced by the absence of
any nationalization provision in the Manila Declaration and Program of Ac-
tion prepared by the Group of 77 for the UNCTAD IV conference which was
held in Nairobi in May 1976.
Notwithstanding these arguments, one cannot ignore the importance of the
General Assembly's rejection of the international legal order in favor of the
national legal order. Even if the Assembly's action has no practical conse-
quence, it does have a symbolic meaning in support of unrestrained, national,
unilateral action and against the establishment or maintenance of a predictable
world order regarding alien-owned property. The action is a signal of General
Assembly support of the invocation of the national legal order rather than
negotiation of necessary change, and endorsement of the rejection of interna-
tional machinery to resolve disputes.
All this is especially disturbing when it is recalled that a major purpose of
the United Nations is "to achieve international cooperation in solving interna-
tional problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian charac-
ter.... "26 One looks to the General Assembly to promote the growth of the in-
ternational legal order as a means of achieving that cooperation. Rejection of
the international legal order will always have some appeal for decision-makers.
But that appeal is held in check or mitigated by a belief that more substantial
benefits relating to international stability and order are derived by working
within the international legal order. The General Assembly should not ad-
vocate measures which suggest otherwise.
26Art. 1(3).
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